| Act done by person bound, or justified by law |
76. Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is bound by law to do it or justified by law in doing it. | | (a) A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer, in conformity with the commands of the law. A has committed no offence. |
| | (b) A sees Z repeatedly stabbing Y with a knife on a public road. Y dies. A, in the exercise of the power which the law gives to all persons apprehending murderers in the act, forcefully seizes Z, in order to detain Z so that Z can be arrested by the police officers when they arrive. A has committed no offence. |
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[15/2019] |
| Act of judge when acting judicially |
| 77. Nothing is an offence which is done by a judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law. |
| Act done pursuant to the judgment or order of a court of justice |
| 78. Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or which is warranted by, the judgment or order of a court of justice, if done while the judgment or order remains in force, is an offence, notwithstanding the court may have had no jurisdiction to pass the judgment or order, provided the person doing the act in good faith believes that the court had such jurisdiction. |
| Act done by person by mistake of fact believing himself bound or justified by law |
| 79.—(1) Unless otherwise provided by written law, nothing is an offence which is done by any person who by reason of a mistake of fact or in ignorance of a fact in good faith believes himself to be bound by law to do it or justified by law in doing it. [15/2019] (2) To avoid doubt, where a person alleges a mistake of fact or ignorance of a fact that may negate the fault element of the offence that the person is charged with, the prosecution must prove the fault element in order to establish liability under the offence.| Explanation 1.—Where the physical and fault elements of an offence are proven, and the accused person proves the defence under subsection (1), the accused person is not guilty of that offence. |
| | Explanation 2.—Where an alleged mistake of fact or ignorance of a fact may negate the fault element of an offence, the accused person does not need to rely on the defence of mistake. The accused person may allege the mistake of fact or ignorance of the fact for the purpose of raising a reasonable doubt that the accused person had the requisite fault element as a result of labouring under the mistake of fact or ignorance of fact. The prosecution must prove the fault element in order to establish liability under the offence. |
| | | (a) A sees Z commit what appears to A to be a murder. A, in the exercise, to the best of his judgment exerted in good faith, of the power which the law gives to all persons of apprehending murderers in the act, seizes Z, in order to bring Z before the proper authorities. A has committed no offence, though it may turn out that Z was acting in self-defence. |
| | (b) A, a police officer, is deployed to perform the duty of screening passengers boarding a flight at the airport. A sees Z, a passenger queuing up to be screened, acting suspiciously. As A approaches Z, Z suddenly shouts aloud that he is carrying a bomb and warns A not to approach further. As A draws his revolver, Z suddenly starts to run away. A, after assessing the circumstances of the case, and to the best of his judgment exerted in good faith, believes that Z has a bomb and will set it off. A shoots Z and Z dies as a result. A has committed no offence, even though it may turn out that Z was not carrying a bomb. |
| | (c) A, a police officer, is deployed to perform patrol duty at an underground train station. A receives information from police headquarters that someone is attempting to plant a bomb in the public transport system. The profile of the suspect is also provided. While patrolling the underground train station, A sees Z, who fits the profile. Z is seen carrying a backpack and behaving suspiciously. A approaches Z and orders him to stop. Z suddenly starts running towards a crowd in the station. A, after assessing the circumstances of the case, and to the best of his judgment exerted in good faith, believes that Z has a bomb and will set it off. A shoots Z and Z dies as a result. A has committed no offence, even though it may turn out that Z was not carrying a bomb. |
| | (d) X, the commander of a naval vessel, is patrolling Singapore territorial waters. X receives information that someone may hijack a vessel in order to commit a terrorist act. X spots vessel A which is proceeding at high speed towards a cruise liner. X orders vessel A to stop her manoeuvre immediately and fires a warning signal. Vessel A instead starts accelerating towards the cruise liner. X, after assessing the circumstances of the case, and to the best of his judgment exerted in good faith, believes that vessel A is going to ram into the cruise liner. X gives an order to fire at vessel A. The persons on board vessel A die as a result. X has committed no offence, even though it may turn out that vessel A was not hijacked nor were there any terrorist on board. |
| | (e) A, an officer of a court, being ordered by that court to arrest Y, and, after due enquiry, believing Z to be Y, arrests Z. A has committed no offence. |
| | (f) A sees a watch on Z’s desk, which is identical to one that A owns, and mistakenly believes the watch is actually his. A intentionally takes the watch out of Z’s possession without Z’s consent while labouring under such mistaken belief. A has not committed an offence of theft as A did not possess the requisite fault element of dishonesty when A took the watch out of Z’s possession. There is no need for A to rely on a defence under this section. |
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[15/2019] [Act 23 of 2021 wef 01/03/2022] |
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| Mistake of law or ignorance of law not defence |
| 79A.—(1) A person’s mistake of law or ignorance of the law is not a defence to a charge for an offence unless it is otherwise provided by written law. [15/2019] | (2) To avoid doubt, where a person alleges a mistake of law or ignorance of the law that may negate the fault element of the offence that the person is charged with, the prosecution must prove the fault element in order to establish liability under the offence. [Act 23 of 2021 wef 01/03/2022] |
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| Accident in the doing of a lawful act |
| 80.—(1) Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner, by lawful means, and with proper care and caution. [15/2019] (2) To avoid doubt, where —| (a) | a person alleges any act is done by accident or misfortune in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner, by lawful means, and with proper care and caution; and | | (b) | the doing of the act allegedly by accident or misfortune may negate the fault element of the offence that the person is charged with, |
| the prosecution must prove the fault element in order to establish liability under the offence. |
| Explanation.—A lawful act in this section is any act which is not an offence under this Code or any written law and which is not otherwise prohibited by law. |
| | | (a) A is at work with a hatchet; the head flies off and kills a man who is standing by. Here, if there was no want of proper caution on the part of A, his act is excusable and not an offence. |
| | (b) A operates a construction crane and activates a control that causes a heavy load to fall onto B, killing B. A did not act negligently, but his activation of the control caused this result because the construction crane was malfunctioning. A has not committed an offence of causing death by doing a negligent act under section 304A as he did not possess the requisite fault element of negligence. |
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[15/2019] [Act 23 of 2021 wef 01/03/2022] |
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| Act likely to cause harm but done to prevent other harm |
81. Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property.| Explanation.—It is a question of fact in such a case whether the harm to be prevented or avoided was of such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of doing the act with the knowledge that it was likely to cause harm. |
| | | (a) A, the captain of a steam vessel, suddenly and without any fault or negligence on his part, finds himself in such a position that, before he can stop his vessel, he must inevitably run down a boat B, with 20 or 30 passengers on board, unless he changes the course of his vessel, and that, by changing his course he must incur risk of running down a boat C, with only 2 passengers on board, which he may possibly clear. Here, if A alters his course without any intention to run down the boat C, and in good faith for the purposes of avoiding the danger to the passengers in the boat B, he is not guilty of an offence, though he may run down the boat C, by doing an act which he knew was likely to cause that effect, if it be found as a matter of fact that the danger which he intended to avoid was such as to excuse him in incurring the risk of running down the boat C. |
| | (b) A in a great fire pulls down houses in order to prevent the conflagration from spreading. He does this with the intention, in good faith, of saving human life or property. Here, if it be found that the harm to be prevented was of such a nature and so imminent as to excuse A’s act, A is not guilty of the offence. |
| | (c) X, the commander of a naval vessel, is deployed in response to a threat of a terrorist attack against a ferry terminal in Singapore. X receives information that vessel A, with a crew of 6, has been hijacked by terrorists and is approaching the ferry terminal at great speed and is likely to collide into the terminal. There is insufficient time to evacuate the persons at the terminal, which is estimated to be about 100. X orders vessel A to stop her manoeuvre immediately and fires a warning signal. However, vessel A continues her advance towards the terminal. Here, if X gives an order to fire at vessel A to disable it, without any intention to cause harm to the crew members of vessel A, and in good faith for the purpose of avoiding the danger to the persons at the terminal, he is not guilty of an offence. This is so even though he knows that he is likely to cause harm to the crew members of vessel A, if it be found as a matter of fact that the danger which X intends to avoid is such as to excuse him in incurring the risk of firing at vessel A. |
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[15/2019] |
| Act of a child below 10 years of age |
| 82. Nothing is an offence which is done by a child below 10 years of age. [15/2019] |
| Act of a child of or above 10 and below 12 years of age, who has not sufficient maturity of understanding |
| 83. Nothing is an offence which is done by a child of or above 10 years and below 12, who has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequence of his conduct on that occasion. [15/2019] |
| Act of person of unsound mind |
84.—(1) Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is —| (a) | incapable of knowing the nature of the act; | | (b) | incapable of knowing that what he is doing is wrong; or [Act 23 of 2021 wef 01/03/2022] | | (c) | completely deprived of any power to control his actions. [Act 23 of 2021 wef 01/03/2022] |
(2) Subsection (1)(b) applies only if the person is incapable of knowing that his act —| (a) | is wrong by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest persons; and | | (b) | is wrong as contrary to law. | | A, while labouring under a delusion, believes that he has received divine instructions to kill Z and that it is morally right for him to do so. A however knows that it is contrary to law to kill Z. A kills Z. Here, the defence of unsoundness of mind is not available to A as he is capable of knowing that it is contrary to law to kill Z. |
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[15/2019] [Act 23 of 2021 wef 01/03/2022] |
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| Intoxication when a defence |
85.—(1) Except as provided in this section and in section 86, intoxication shall not constitute a defence to any criminal charge.(2) Intoxication is a defence to any criminal charge if by reason of the intoxication the person charged, at the time of the act or omission complained of —| (a) | did not know what he was doing; or | | (b) | did not know that such act or omission was wrong, [Act 23 of 2021 wef 01/03/2022] |
| and the state of intoxication was caused without the knowledge or against the will of the person charged with the offence. |
[15/2019] |
(2A) Subsection (2)(b) only applies if the person charged, at the time of the act or omission complained of, did not know that the act or omission —| (a) | was wrong by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest persons; and | | (b) | was wrong as contrary to law. [Act 23 of 2021 wef 01/03/2022] |
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| (3) Intoxication is a defence to any criminal charge if by reason of the intoxication the person charged was of unsound mind as determined in accordance with section 84. [15/2019] |
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| Effect of defence of intoxication when established |
| 86.—(1) Where the defence under section 85 is established, then the accused person must be acquitted, except that if the person was of unsound mind by reason of intoxication, section 84 of this Code and sections 251 and 252 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 will apply. [15/2019] | (2) Intoxication shall be taken into account for the purpose of determining whether the person charged had formed any intention or had any knowledge or belief, specific or otherwise, in the absence of which he would not be guilty of the offence. [15/2019] |
| (3) For the purposes of this section and section 85 “intoxication” shall be deemed to include a state produced by narcotics or drugs. [15/2019] |
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| Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done by consent |
87. Nothing, which is not intended to cause death or grievous hurt, and which is not known by the doer to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, to any person above 18 years of age, who has given consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm; or by reason of any harm which it may be known by the doer to be likely to cause to any such person who has consented to take the risk of that harm. | | A and Z agree to fence with each other for amusement. This agreement implies the consent of each to suffer any harm which, in the course of such fencing, may be caused without foul play; and if A, while playing fairly, hurts Z, A commits no offence. |
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| Act not intended to cause death done by consent in good faith for the benefit of a person |
88. Nothing, which is not intended to cause death, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause, to any person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given a consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm, or to take the risk of that harm. | | A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause the death of Z, who suffers under a painful complaint, but not intending to cause Z’s death, and intending, in good faith, Z’s benefit, performs that operation on Z, with Z’s consent. A has committed no offence. |
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| Act done in good faith for the benefit of a child or person of unsound mind, by or by consent of guardian |
89. Nothing, which is done in good faith for the benefit of a person below 12 years of age, or of unsound mind, by or by consent, either express or implied, of the guardian or other person having lawful charge of that person, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause, to that person:| Provided that this exception shall not extend to — |
| (a) | the intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death; | | (b) | the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity; | | (c) | the voluntary causing of grievous hurt, or to the attempting to cause grievous hurt, unless it be for the purpose of preventing death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity; | | (d) | the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend. | | A, in good faith, for the benefit of his child, being below 12 years of age, without his child’s consent, has his child cut for the stone by a surgeon, knowing it to be likely that the operation will cause the child’s death, but not intending to cause the child’s death. A is within the exception, inasmuch as his object was the cure of the child. |
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| Consent given under fear or misconception, by person of unsound mind, etc., and by child |
90. A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code —| (a) | if the consent is given by a person —| (i) | under fear of injury or wrongful restraint to the person or to some other person; or | | (ii) | under a misconception of fact, |
| and the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; |
| | (b) | if the consent is given by a person who, from unsoundness of mind, mental incapacity, intoxication, or the influence of any drug or other substance, is unable to understand the nature and consequence of that to which he gives his consent; or | | (c) | unless the contrary appears from the context, if the consent is given by a person who is below 12 years of age. |
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| Acts which are offences independently of harm caused to the person consenting, are not within the exceptions in sections 87, 88 and 89 |
91. The exceptions in sections 87, 88 and 89 do not extend to acts which are offences independently of any harm which they may cause, or be intended to cause, or be known to be likely to cause, to the person giving the consent, or on whose behalf the consent is given. | | Causing miscarriage, unless it is authorised under the Termination of Pregnancy Act 1974 is an offence independently of any harm which it may cause or be intended to cause to the woman. Therefore it is not an offence “by reason of such harm”; and the consent of the woman, or of her guardian, to the causing of such miscarriage does not justify the act. |
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| Act done in good faith for the benefit of a person without consent |
92. Nothing is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause to a person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, even without that person’s consent, if the circumstances are such that it is impossible for that person to signify consent, or if that person is incapable of giving consent, and has no guardian or other person in lawful charge of him from whom it is possible to obtain consent in time for the thing to be done with benefit:| Provided that this exception shall not extend to — |
| (a) | the intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death; | | (b) | the doing of anything which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or infirmity; | | (c) | the voluntary causing of hurt, or to the attempting to cause hurt, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or hurt; | | (d) | the abetment of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend. | | (a) Z is thrown from his horse, and is insensible. A, a surgeon, finds that Z requires to be trepanned. A, not intending Z’s death, but in good faith, for Z’s benefit, performs the trepan before Z recovers his power of judging for himself. A has committed no offence. |
| | (b) [Deleted by Act 51 of 2007] |
| | (c) A, a surgeon, sees a child suffer an accident which is likely to prove fatal unless an operation is immediately performed. There is no time to apply to the child’s guardian. A performs the operation in spite of the entreaties of the child, intending, in good faith, the child’s benefit. A has committed no offence. |
| | (d) A is in a house which is on fire, with Z, a child. People below hold out a blanket. A drops the child from the house‑top, knowing it to be likely that the fall may kill the child, but not intending to kill the child, and intending in good faith, the child’s benefit. Here, even if the child is killed by the fall, A has committed no offence. |
| | Explanation.—Mere pecuniary benefit is not benefit within the meaning of sections 88, 89 and 92. |
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| Communication made in good faith |
93. No communication made in good faith is an offence by reason of any harm to the person to whom it is made, if it is made for the benefit of that person. | | A, a surgeon, in good faith, communicates to a patient his opinion that he cannot live. The patient dies in consequence of the shock. A has committed no offence, though he knew it to be likely that the communication might cause the patient’s death. |
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| Act to which a person is compelled by threats |
94. Except murder and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats, which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to that person or any other person will otherwise be the consequence:| Provided that the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint. |
| Explanation 1.—A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being beaten, joins gang-robbers knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of this exception on the ground of his having been compelled by his associates to do anything that is an offence by law. |
| | Explanation 2.—A person seized by gang-robbers, and forced by threat of instant death to do a thing which is an offence by law — for example, a smith compelled to take his tools and to force the door of a house for the gang‑robbers to enter and plunder it — is entitled to the benefit of this exception. |
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| 95. Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm. |
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